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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FAMILY
Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor
It is a true pleasure to be here at the University of Pennsylania
Law School's sesquicentennial celebration and at the Family Law
Symposium. The celebration makes me feel young-by comparison.
It is appropriate that one of the centerpieces of your celebration
should be this symposium on family law. The family is at the heart of
American life, as well as American law. As justice Powell %%Tote on
behalf of the Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, "the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished values, moral and cultural."'
It is this deep commitment to the family that has led so many of
you to dedicate your careers to the development of family law. Family
law poses special challenges and requiresjudges and attorneys, as well
as other professionals like psychologists and social workers, to study
and work together. And you must work together often-in 1998
alone, approximately five million cases involving domestic matters
were filed in state courts.-
The ultimate goal, of course, is to maintain and improve a legal
system that protects and respects the family, both as a unit and as a
group of individuals with their own rights and interests. It is not an
easy task, particularly in light of the momentous changes in our soci-
ety that are taking families and family law in new directions. This
symposium is addressing many issues on the frontiers of family law,
including new reproductive technologies, welfare reform, foster care
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reform, and changing ideas about what it means to be a family in the
first place. It is therefore appropriate that you should gather at the
beginning of this new millennium to assess the challenges and possi-
bilities that face our nation's families.
I have been asked to speak this evening about the Supreme Court
and the family. In looking at the agenda for this weekend's sympo-
sium, I could not help but notice that my remarks tonight are the
only part of the weekend dedicated to the role of the Supreme Court
and the Constitution in the development of family law. Your panels
focus not on constitutional doctrine, but on such topics as "The
Changing Status of the Child" and "The Future of Marriage." And
your discussions are led not by federal judges, but by state judges,
practicing attorneys, academics, psychologists, and social workers.
By structuring the symposium in this way, the organizers have, I
think, struck a balance that correctly reflects the role of the Supreme
Court in the development of family law. The Supreme Court has
been one voice in the development of family law. At times, it has
been a powerful voice. But it is certainly not the only voice in this
area, or even the primary one. Rather, family law has traditionally
been the domain of state government. Under our federal system, the
States retain primary responsibility for promoting public health,
safety, morals, and the general welfare. This police power gives the
States the authority to regulate matters that directly affect the struc-
ture of family life, including marriage, divorce, abortion, contracep-
tion, legitimacy, child protection, adoption, custody, and child sup-
port. Although Congress has recently passed laws such as the Child
Support Recovery Act and the Violence Against Women Act which
seek to regulate certain aspects of family relations, these statutes are
the exception rather than the rule.
The Framers' decision to leave the creation and administration of
family law to the States was a wise one. As then-Justice Rehnquist
once noted, "[w] e have found ... that leaving the States free to ex-
periment with various remedies has produced novel approaches and
promising progress."3 It makes good sense to allow those who work
most closely with families to use their experience to shape judgments
about what laws and policies are best to keep children safe, to keep
families nourished and sheltered, and to keep marriages together or,
when they are beyond repair, to make the split as equitable as possi-
ble. Indeed, most, if not all, States have set up specialized courts to
deal with family and/or juvenile matters. This structure recognizes
that families need specialized and individualized attention, and that
family law matters more often than not raise fact-specific problems
regarding the equities of the particular case and the best interests of
the parties involved.
3 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 771 (1982) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
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But this is not to say that the States have unfettered power to regu-
late families. The States are subject to constitutional constraints, and
the Supreme Court has, when appropriate, struck down state laws
that intrude on the core functions of the family or on the individual
liberties of family members. In fulfilling this role, the Court has spo-
ken of our common understandings of the family, our common aspi-
rations, and the need to have a deeper understanding of the values
that lie at the heart of our tradition.
For example, the Court has identified the freedom to marry as
"one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."4 Accordingly, we have struck down state laws
prohibiting marriage between whites and persons of color,5 setting
filing fees that in effect barred many poor people from receiving a di-
vorce,6 requiring applicants for a marriage license to show that they
have no current or future child support obligations,' and barring
state prisoners from marrying."
Our cases recognize "the right of the individual, married or sin-
gle, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child."9 Thus, we have invalidated state laws prohibiting
the use of contraceptives0 and barring women from obtaining an
abortion in the early stages of pregnancy.
And we have stated that natural parents have a "fundamental lib-
erty interest.., in the care, custody, and management of their
child."12 We have found inconsistent with this interest certain state
laws mandating public schooling,'s setting a low evidentiary threshold
in proceedings allowing termination of parental rights," and allowing
state courts to award nonparental visitation rights without consider-
ing the wishes of the parent' 5
There is a limit, though, to the Supreme Court's role in the de-
velopment of family law. The Supreme Court generally becomes in-
volved in family cases only when the case implicates an overarching
constitutional issue, such as the scope of the due process or equal
protection clauses. But the adjudication of constitutional disputes
does not necessarily translate to the effective resolution of family dis-
putes. While constitutional due process doctrine is primarily con-
4 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
5I .
6 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,374 (1971).
7 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,377 (1978).
8 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,81 (1987).
9 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis omitted).
10 Grisivold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965); EiMsStadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,164 (1973).
"2 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
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15 Troxel v. Granille, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2059 (2000).
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cerned with the relationship of individuals to the State, the resolution
of family disputes focuses primarily on the relationship of individuals
with each other. In family cases, the rights of individuals are inter-
twined, and the family itself has a collective personality. Thus, the
due process model may not be the best framework for resolving
multi-party conflicts where children, parents, professionals, and the
State all have conflicting interests.' 6
Accordingly, family law is-and must be-a collaborative enter-
prise. While the Supreme Court is well positioned to articulate gen-
eral principles of constitutional law, there is much more to family law
than the setting of constitutional rules. Underlying each family law
case that reaches us are issues of state law and policy, as well as an ac-
tual family with its own dynamics, challenges, and problems.
Three cases illustrate the Supreme Court's role in the develop-
ment of family law, as well as the need for innovative family policy
and family law practitioners who can give individual families the spe-
cial attention they require. The first is a case we decided just last
Term, Troxel v. Granville.7 Tommie Granville is the mother of two
girls. While the girls' father, Brad Troxel, was alive, his parents,
Jenifer and Gary Troxel, visited with their granddaughters regularly.
However, some months after Brad committed suicide, Tommie in-
formed the Troxels that she wanted to limit their visits with the girls
to one short visit per month and special holidays. The Troxels went
to state court, seeking to obtain more extensive visitation rights under
a Washington state statute that authorized a state superior court to
grant visitation rights to any person when the court was satisfied that
such visitation would serve the best interests of the child. The state
court determined that it was in the girls' best interests to have ex-
tended visitation with the Troxels. Granville appealed, arguing that
the state statute unconstitutionally interfered with her fundamental
right as a parent to rear her children.
From the perspective of constitutional law, Tommie Granville was
correct. Under our "extensive precedent," we found it clear that "the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fun-
damental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children."'8 Because the statute did not
require the state judge to accord Tommie Granville's wishes any
weight whatsoever, and because there was no showing that she was
unfit to determine her daughters' best interests, we held that the
Washington statute was unconstitutional as applied to the parties in
the case. From this perspective, the Troxel case presented the Court
with the opportunity to do what it does best-protect fundamental
individual liberties against state infringement.
6 EVA R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERIcAN FAMILY 6-7 (1986).
17 Troxe4 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
I8 Id. at 2060.
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There is much more to the Troxel case than the conflict between a
State and one mother's right to determine how to raise her children,
however. From another perspective, Troxel is a human drama, cen-
tered on a particular family and its particular circumstances. The
case tells a compelling story of parents who are grieving the loss of
their son and trying to carry on his memory by maintaining a close
relationship with his daughters. There is a mother who is seeking
both to include her daughters' grandparents in their lives, and also to
move on, remarry, and create a new family for her children. And
there are two girls who lost their father but who have immediate and
extended family members literally battling to spend time with them.
As a matter of constitutional law, Tommie Granville may get to make
the final decision as to whom her children will visit. But as a matter
of parenting and family relationships, the decision is a difficult one
and one for which the law has little to offer.
Troxel is not the only case in which the Court has dealt with the
rights of grandparents. Another is Moore v. City of East Cleveland.'9 In
that case, a woman named Inez Moore shared her home with her son
Dale and her two grandsons, DaleJr. andJohn Jr. john Jr., the child
of Mrs. Moore's other son, came to live with his grandmother after
his own mother died. Approximately nine years later, Mrs. Moore,
who was then sixty-three years old, received a notice from the city in-
forming her that she was in violation of a housing ordinance that lim-
ited occupancy of a dwelling to members of a single family, and di-
recting her to remove John Jr. from her home. When she refused to
expel her ten-year-old grandson, Mrs. Moore was fined and sentenced
to five days in jail. She appealed, arguing that the city ordinance vio-
lated the Due Process Clause by making a crime out of a grand-
mother's choice to live with her grandson.
Mrs. Moore was, of course, correct. The Court recognized that
"[o]urs is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and
equally deserving of constitutional recognition." ', While the Court
acknowledged the traditional state power to restrict land use, it con-
firmed that that power may not be used to "slic[e] deeply into the
family itself,"2 ' particularly when the state law advances few, if any,
other state regulatory interests.
Like Troxel, Moore was from one perspective a case uniquely within
the competence of the Supreme Court because it dealt with the
proper allocation of power between an individual and the State. But,
both cases have an additional dimension: They reflect the "changing
,9 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
*0 1d at504.
-21 1d& at 498.
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realities of the American family"2 and serve to clarify the appropriate
boundaries for state regulation of the family. Although the Court's
early family-related jurisprudence extolled the virtues of the nuclear
family, we have recognized that "[t]he demographic changes of the
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American fam-
ily."23 As single parent households increase in number, "persons out-
side the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to
assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing. In many cases, grandpar-
ents play an important role."4
Moore teaches that when families work out their own guardianship
arrangements, the State generally must respect those decisions. But
Troxel clarified that States may also properly attempt to protect the
relationships children form with parents outside the nuclear family.
Although there are limits to what States can do, we noted in Troxel
that each of the fifty states has passed a nonparental visitation statute.
And we refused to hold that such statutes are per se invalid. Rather,
the States are free to provide for nonparental visitation as long as
they provide appropriate weight to the parent's determination of the
child's best interests. In this way, we have given States the necessary
space to create structures that promote the best interests of children.
It is not the province of the Court to decide as a policy matter how
best to allocate responsibility for the rearing of children.
Another case that exemplifies the abilities and the limitations of
the Supreme Court in the area of family law is Santosky v. Kramer.5
Unlike the Troxel and Moore children, the Santosky children had
too few people wanting to care for them. Specifically, John and An-
nie Santosky neglected their three children, Tina, John, and Jed.
The State of New York removed the children from the Santoskys' cus-
tody and embarked on "diligent" but unsuccessful efforts "to encour-
age and strengthen the parental relationship."26 Four and a half years
later, the State moved in family court to terminate the Santoskys' pa-
rental rights. The court agreed, finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that John and Annie Santosky were "incapable, even with
public assistance, of planning for the future of their children. 27 The
Santoskys appealed, arguing that the statutory preponderance of the
evidence standard unconstitutionally infringed upon their due proc-
ess rights.
The majority agreed with the Santoskys. Given "[t]he fundamen-
tal liberty interest of natural parents in the case, custody, and man-
agement of their child[ren]," and because "parents retain a vital in-
-- Troxe4 120 S. Ct. at 2059.
23Id.
24 Id.
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
6 Id. at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 Id.
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terest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life,"!'
the Court held that due process required the State to produce at least
"clear and convincing evidence" of parental unfitness in proceedings
to terminate parental rights.'-
Although Ijoined then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent and would have
left New York's statutory domestic relations scheme intact, even the
majority recognized the need for solicitude for state laws governing
domestic relations. In reaching its holding, the majority may well
have been moved by the fact that most states had already imple-
mented a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. Further,
the majority declined to set a particular burden of proof, recognizing
that "the determination of the precise burden... is a matter of state
law properly left to state legislatures and state courts." -3
Thus, Santosky also demonstrates both the ability of the Court to
vindicate individual rights, and the fact that it is for the States in the
first instance to create and implement family law. And Santoslky also
reminds us that underneath ever), legal debate over family law is a
family in crisis. After we remanded the case, the New York courts
upheld the termination of the Santoskys' parental rights.' Even un-
der the higher standard of proof, the court found that the Santoskys
had failed to plan for the future of their children. Applying state
statutory and case law regarding what is required of parents in their
situation, the court found that the Santoskys had refused family and
child counseling and parenting classes, and therefore had "not only
failed to take any steps toward formulating and acting upon a plan
for the.., support of their children ... but they also displayed a total
lack of awareness of the need for such a plan."2 Operating within the
appropriate constitutional ground rules, this is precisely the type of
determination our federal system has left to the state courts.
In sum, we all have our role to play in the development of family
law. The Supreme Court has articulated ideals regarding who the
family is and what its core functions are. The Court has imposed lim-
its, consistent within the Constitution, on State efforts to impinge on
those fundamental interests. But there are many questions the Su-
preme Court is not equipped to resolve. The primary responsibility
for creating a legal system that effectively promotes the interests of
families and their individual members lies with the States. And the
importance of family law practitioners who take the time to give indi-
vidualized attention to families and work to achieve their best inter-
ests cannot be overstated. As our society grow and changes, and as
the issues facing families become more complex, your work will con-
8Id. at 753.
Id. at 769.
so Id. at 769-70.
31 See Kramerv.John "AA" 1, 453 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1982) (In rejohn ' ).
Id. at 945.
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tinue to be a challenge. I wish you well this weekend as you engage
in what I hope will be a useful dialogue. Thank you.
